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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Complainant/Appellee, Vicky Ann McCord ("McCord"), pursuant to Rule 24(b)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following brief. McCord concurs that
if this Court finds that Appellant Maverik Country Stores, Inc.'s ("Maverik") requests for
review were timely filed, jurisdiction exists under the statutes cited by Maverik for this
appeal (Docket No. 920206-CA) only. Note, however, that this acknowledgement does not
in any way waive McCord's argument that the appeal docketed as No. 910413-CA should be
dismissed because, at the time of the initial Petition for Review of the Administrative Order,
the Administrative Law Judge's ("AU") June 26, 1991 Order was not final and Maverik had
not exhausted its administrative remedies.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is important to focus on the applicable standard of review because Maverik, in its
four initial issues presented for review, has apparently tried to frame some of its arguments as
alleged legal questions as opposed to factual questions. The court will note that Maverik,
while only listing four arguments in its issues section, strays far from the original issues
presented for review and focuses on factual questions as well.
Because these proceedings were commenced after January 1, 1988, the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989) governs.
This Court has repeatedly set forth the standards of review under UAPA. "[Findings of fact
33228.1

will be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the
whole record before the court.'" Stewart v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (quoting Merriam v. Board of Review. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
This Court has defined "substantial evidence" as that which a reasonable person "might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Merriam. 812 P.2d at 450. Questions concerning the
applications of facts to the statutes in circumstances where the agency is given discretion
because of legislative intent or because of the Agency's expertise will not be overturned
unless it is unreasonable; and only interpretation of statutes for pure questions of law in
situations where the Agency has not been given discretion are reviewed using the correctionof-error standard. Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d
581, 588-89 (Utah 1991); Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Employment Sec. 819 P.2d 361,
364-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Wurst v. Department of Employment Sec. 818 P.2d 1036,
1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Maverik has stated four issues for review which largely relate to jurisdiction of the
Commission, exhaustion of remedies, and the finality of the Commission's orders. Those
issues are as follows:
1.

Was the June 26, 1991 order of the AU a final order allowing Maverik to

appeal to this Court without requesting review of the AU's order by the full commission
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even though the issue of attorneys' fees has been reserved for further briefing and resolution
by the AU?
2.

Assuming arguendo that this Court did not have jurisdiction and that the

Commission retained jurisdiction, was the "filing" of a request for review complete upon
mailing?
3.

Even assuming once again that the Commission had jurisdiction, and assuming

that the mailing of the request was insufficient, but that the Commission abused its discretion
in failing to grant an extension to Maverik to file its request for review, was the error
harmless?
4.

Were the subsequent orders of the Commission final within the meaning of

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989)?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While Maverik contends that the Industrial Commission has made a convoluted mess
of these proceedings, the facts of this case are relatively easy to understand. As outlined in
the June 26th Order of the ALJ and supported by the facts, Maverik's Statement of Relevant
Facts substantially followed the Order's facts; however, Maverik once again tries to
improperly slant the facts in its favor. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy,
McCord concurs with the facts as laid out in the Industrial Commission of Utah's
("Commission") brief and notes only a brief summary of the facts, in addition to those facts
stated by Maverik that McCord finds incorrect.
33228.1
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The basic facts are that McCord was terminated within hours of her request to leave
work to have her heart examined. Maverik's manager perceived McCord as having a serious
heart condition and fired her on that basis. This action was clearly illegal discrimination by
Maverik against a person perceived to have a serious handicap.
In the "Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Agency Level" section in Maverik's
Brief, pp. 2-5, McCord disputes the following assertions and implications:
1.

"1990-1991 - For some unexplained reason, the proceedings languish and are

not actively prosecuted." McCord disagrees with this self-serving conclusion.
2.

"February 12, 1991 - 'No cause determination' is written on an official file

document, after the Division loses contact with McCord for a considerable while." McCord
denies any implication that there was ever a "no cause" finding. There is no evidence in the
record that the handwritten words "no cause" came from the Commission or any evidence on
when it was written on the document. There is evidence that the official determination that
Maverik discriminated against McCord.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, Maverik does not marshal the evidence to challenge any factual errors it asserts
nor does it cite to the record for many of its allegations and assertions as required by Rule
24(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, these factually-based disputes
and allegations should be dismissed.

33228.1
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Second, Maverik's initial Petition for Review from this Court (Docket No. 910413CA) did not transfer jurisdiction from the Commission to this Court because it requested
review of an order that was not final and Maverik had not exhausted its administrative
remedies.
Third, Maverik did not timely file its requests for review of the ALJ's orders to the
Commission, and even if those requests were found timely, the Commission addressed those
review issues and thus any error was harmless.
Fourth, the ALJ's orders were sufficiently clear as to set forth the relief and damages
ordered.
Fifdi, Maverik's due process rights were not violated and it is not entitled to a trial de
novo.
ARGUMENT
While Maverik lays out four issues in the "Issues Presented for Review" section of its
brief (Maverik's Brief, p. 1), in fact Maverik argues nine issues in the brief. McCord
concurs with the arguments in the Commission's brief concerning the procedural arguments
raised by Maverik and will not waste the Court's time by detailing those arguments. Instead,
McCord will only make brief mention of some of those issues and concentrate on the
substantive merits of Maverik's arguments and its dispute of factual allegations. McCord also
notes that Maverik makes arguments of law and fact by referring to the initial Petition to this
Court. While all these arguments can be confusing, McCord attempts to cut through this
33228.1
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confusion and demonstrates that this Petition, standing alone or with the other Petition,
should be dismissed.
I.

MAVERIK FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE TO ADEQUATELY
DISPUTE THE COMMISSION'S AND ALJ'S DETERMINATIONS.

As noted above, this Court will not disturb the findings of the Commission unless
Maverik can demonstrate that they are not supported by substantial evidence. Stewart v.
Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Merriam v. Board of Review.
812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Maverik's briefs in both petitions are woeftilly
inadequate in challenging the findings of the Commission. Maverik confuses the issues when
it protests the procedure of the Commission and asserts constitutional violations. Maverik
obviously disagrees with the Commission's findings and conclusions, but fails to adequately
challenge them. Maverik requests a trial de novo upon vague assertions of error in law and
fact.
Maverik alludes to evidence in the record upon which the ALJ relied in making her
findings and thus acknowledges there is evidence to support of the findings it contests.
However, Maverik's briefs do not marshal the evidence to display either any support for the
findings or any flaw in the evidence upon which the ALT relied. In reality, all Maverik does
is show there was a dispute in the evidence (as is almost always the case) or that Maverik had
no contrary evidence and that the ALJ chose McCord's evidence upon which to rely.
Maverik does not satisfy its burden. Accordingly, because of this failure to marshal the
33228.1
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evidence and demonstrate that the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, this Court
should accept as conclusive the ALJ's findings. Stewart. 831 P.2d at 137-38; Merriam. 812
P.2d at 450.
In addition, Maverik has failed to reference this Court to documentary citations to
support its allegations on pages 12 - 15 of its brief and thus fails to meet the requirements of
Rule 24(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which requires "citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Maverik's bold assertions should be
dismissed.
II.

JURISDICTION TO ACT BECAUSE MAVERIK'S INITIAL PETITION FOR
REVIEW WAS INEFFECTIVE TO CONFER JURISDICTION TO THIS
COURT.

Maverik argues that merely because it filed an appeal, the Commission was without
jurisdiction to continue to make determinations in this case. This argument ignores the fact
that an appeal filed without regard to the finality of the order appealed from, exhaustion of
administrative remedies and other review and appellate rules does not automatically confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals or strip the Commission of its jurisdiction.
The AU's June 26, 1991 Order was not final within the requirements of UAPA, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (1989), nor had Maverik exhausted its administrative remedies in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1989).
McCord concurs with the Commission's argument in Sections I and II of its brief,
Commission Brief, pp. 28-35, that it was clear that the June 26, 1991 Order was not final
33228.1
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and that Maverik should be required to exhaust the administrative remedies before filing an
appeal and that the Commission had the power to enter its orders and deny review. In the
interest of judicial economy, McCord will not repeat those arguments here and refers the
Court to the Commission's brief.
III.

MAVERIK DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE RULES IN FILING ITS
REQUESTS FOR REVIEW AND EVEN THOUGH THE COMMISSION
DENIED REVIEW, ITS ORDER INCLUDED A REVIEW OF THE
DISPUTED ISSUES, THUS ANY ALLEGED ERROR WAS HARMLESS.

Maverik argues that not only did the Commission rule against it, but that the
Commission ignored its subsequent requests for review and it alleged bases for a good cause
extension. This is simply not true.
As noted in the Commission's Brief at pp. 37 - 42, Maverik did not timely file its
request for review of the June 26, 1991 Order. Maverik first requested review of the June
26, 1991 Order on October 11, 1991, well outside the 30-day requirement of Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12 (1989). Appendix A, Request for Review; R. 310-319.
Further, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant an extension.
Maverik failed to set out its argument regarding good cause for delay when it submitted
either its request for review (Appendix A) or request for reconsideration (Appendix B) even
though the Commission had informed Maverik in its February 28, 1992 Order Denying
Review of requirement to show good cause for an untimely motion (Appendix C). Maverik
waited until submitting its Limited Request for Reconsideration to make out grounds for good
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cause (Appendix D). The Commission is correct in its determination that Maverik waived
good cause grounds for its belated request.
Although there was some question as to the finality of the June 26, 1991 order and the
Commission determined initially that Maverik's filing was untimely, the Commission clearly
considered and responded to all of Maverik's contentions in its orders denying review and
reconsideration nonetheless. (Appendix C; Appendix E). Therefore, the alleged error was
harmless.
IV.

THE ORDERS OF THE AU ARE FINAL AND MORE THAN
ADEQUATELY SET FORTH THE RELIEF AND THE DAMAGES.

The ALJ's Orders of June 26, 1991 regarding damages (Exhibit F) and the
Supplemental Order of September 10, 1991 regarding attorneys' fees (Exhibit G) were clear
and set forth an award of damages and attorneys' fees that can clearly be determined.
Maverik argues that because the Order of June 26, 1991 does not set forth a specific number
in terms of damages, that Order lacks specificity and the damages cannot be determined.
This argument is patently false.
The Order sets forth the following damages (in addition to injunctive relief not at issue
here):
1.

Pay McCord back pay at a rate of $3.35 per four for 24 hours per week, or

$80.40 per week from the date of termination through the date of the Order (June 26, 1991).
Appendix F, pp. 8-9. Further, that McCord was to be credited with two subsequent
33228.1
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increases in the federal minimum wage, the first, effective April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour,
and the second effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour. R. 138.
2.

McCord's back pay was to be reduced by all earnings from interim

employment including her employment at Ashley Elementary School. R. 138.
3.

The ALJ awarded McCord attorneys' fees of $19,731.00 and costs of

$1,536.26. Appendix G; R. 323.
These Orders set forth a specific formula upon which to determine an award of
damages, costs and attorneys' fees. That Maverik would assert that damages could not be
determined because the ALJ did not add up those figures is meritless and harmless.
The disingenuousness of Maverik's argument becomes apparent when it is noted that
Maverik's dispute of McCord's attorneys' fees includes assertions regarding the computation
of damages awarded to McCord. See Appendix E, p. 1; R. 254.
For the foregoing reasons, Maverik's Petition for review of the Orders should be
dismissed.
V.

MAVERIK IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TRIAL DE NOVO BECAUSE OF ITS
VAGUE CONSTITUTIONALITY CLAIMS.

As described above, the ALJ and the Commission has completely addressed Maverik's
claims of error and has correctly applied the UAPA and other statutes in denying Maverik's
subsequent requests for review. Even when denying review, the Commission has reviewed
Maverik's contentions. Therefore, any error now claimed by Maverik is harmless.
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In its final argument, Maverik makes a vague and unsubstantiated claim that it has
been denied its due process rights and is entitled to a trial de novo. Clearly, this request
implies that the factual findings made by the ALJ are in error because of a deficiency in the
hearing. But Maverik does not state any particulars. Maverik notes that a trial de novo used
to be the procedure and then appears to make the argument that because it is no longer the
procedure, it is unconstitutional. It is unclear whether Maverik is arguing that the
administrative procedure is unconstitutional on its face or whether the procedure as applied to
Maverik has deprived it of its constitutional rights to access to the courts under the Utah
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11.
Maverik's vague arguments cannot support a claim as to the constitutionality of the
Utah's administrative agency procedure. Utah courts have found in a workman's
compensation setting that the delegation of power to the Industrial Commission does not
violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Industrial Comm'n v. Evans. 52
Utah 394, 174 P. 825 (1918). More is needed to contest constitutionality.
Neither can those claims support a deprivation of due process argument. Maverik
does not give particulars as to how it was prejudiced by the hearing or the process or even
how the procedure was unfair. When determining whether due process has been violated and
a new trial is warranted, this Court has ruled that "due process demands a new trial when the
appearance of unfairness is so plain that [the appellate court is] left with the abiding
impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing unfair." Tolman v. Salt Lake
33228.1
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County Attorney. 828 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Bunnell v. Industrial
Common. 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n.l (Utah 1987)).
Clearly, the ALJ and the Commission did not engage in conduct so unfair that it
would not meet the standard. Maverik did not comply with the procedural rules and cannot
now claim that its constitutional rights have been violated.
CONCLUSION
Maverik's petition in this Petition, Docket No. 920296-CA, should be dismissed
because it is meritless and because Maverik failed to marshal the evidence in support of its
claims of error. Further, Maverik' petition for review in Docket No. 910413-CA should be
dismissed due to lack of finality of the order from which it seeks review and Maverik's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
DATED this MU] day of February, 1993.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

By
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James W. Stewart
Lisa A. Jones
Attorneys for Complainant Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 7?^

day of February, 1993, I caused to be hand

delivered and lodged a draft of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE McCORD with the Utah Court of
Appeals.

M^^OS^T^^
I hereby certify that on the 7A&1 day of February, 1993, I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, the required number of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE McCORD, to
the following:
Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
David C. Cundick
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Benjamin Sims
Utah State Industrial Commission
Anti-Discrimination Division
100 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
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APPENDIX A
October 11, 1991, Request for Review

Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
David C. Cundick, #4817
Attorneys for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
HEARING ROOM, 160 EAST 300 SOUTH
P. O. BOX 510910
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84151-0910
UADD # 89-0031
ooOoo
VICKY ANN MCCORD
Charging Party

REQUEST FOR REVIEW

vs.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE
Respondent
ooOoo
Respondent Maverik Country Stores, Inc. hereby requests a
review by the full Commission

of the "SUPPLIMENTAL ORDER" and

the earlier findings, conclusions and order, issued on September
10 f 1991 and June 26 f 1991 respectively.
The errors in the September 10, 1991 order include
whether the amount of attorney fees awarded is erroneously high,
and whether it should bear some relation to the damages sought.

As to both orderf did the ALJ err in failing to determine
the amount of damages?
The errors in the June 26 Order, phrased as issues for

review, are as follows:
I.
Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in awarding McCord lost
wages for time periods after she acquired a better paying job,
which she later quit?
(Arbitrary and capricious or oppressive
and unreasonable. Petty v. Utah State Bd. of Regentsy 595 P.2d
481 (Utah 1979)}.
II. Did the ALJ err in finding that Maverik treated McCord "as
if" she were handicapped?
(Substantial evidence test. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 776 P.2d 63
(Utah App. 1989)}.
Alternatively,* was that finding arbitrary
and capricious?
(Hurst v. Board of the Indust. Com., 723 P.2d
416 (Utah 1986)}.
III. Did the ALJ incorrectly find that any perceived abnormality
constitutes a perceived "handicap".
(Correction of error
standard — review for correctness of statutory interpretation.
Hurley v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 767 P.2d 524 (Utah
1988)}.
IV. Did the ALJ err in finding that clerking at a convenience
store is a "major life activity" under the facts of the case?
(Rational basis and reasonableness, applying law to facts, Dept.
of Air Force v. Dept. of Emplmt. Sec, 786 P.2d 1361 (Utah App.
1990)}.
V.
Was it error to find handicapped discrimination when no
medical expert was called to testify?
(Substantial evidence
test. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com.,
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)}.
VI. Did the ALJ err in not ruling that McCord cannot prevail,
since she has not produced substantial evidence that she was
"otherwise qualified" to act in the job. (Substantial evidence
test. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com.,
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)}.

- 2 -

Authorities respecting issues on review.
R486-1-3(F) (1),(3), (4) and (6), Dtah Admin. Code.
§ 34-4-2(9), Utah Code
§ 34-35-1, et seq.r Dtah Code.
S 34-35-6(a)(i), Utah Code.
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 637 (Utah
1983).

Maverik's Trial Brief is attached, and its arguments are
all incorporated by reference.
^j
;
Respectively Submitted this /
day of October, 1991.

P72X/1.
Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
David C* Cundick
Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
Benjamin Sims of the Commissionf and^ to James W. Stewartf
counsel for claimant McCordf on the / 0 — day of Octoberf 1991,
at 1500 First Interstate Plazaf 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101.

ynM ^m.

Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX B
March 19, 1992, Request for Reconsideration

DECEIVED
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
David C. Cundick, #4817
Attorneys for Respondent
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9638

WAR 1 r> 1??2
NDUSTRIAL C O M M I S S I
^DISCRIMINATION nivie^

IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
VICKY ANN MCCORD,
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
Applicant,
UADD Case No. 89-0031

vs.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE (sic),
Defendant.

TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH:
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission
reconsider its "Order Denying Review"

f

issued on February 28, 1992.

This Request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code.
The grounds for relief from the order are as follows:
1. The Commission has erroneously interpreted section 63-46b1(9) to make the filing of Maverikfs Petition for Review untimely,
and to avoid exercise of the Commission's discretion in extending
any such deadline.

The statute expressly applies only to time

1

periods "established for judicial review."

It does not apply to

agency review.
2.

To the extent necessary, Maverik hereby moves for a one

day extension to petition for review by the Commission.
3.

The Commission has misperceived the law, in holding that

the June 26, 1991 order of the ALJ was final.
specifically

and expressly reserved

Issues were

in that order

(including

attorney fees), and damages were not even calculated.

The order

was comparable to a partial summary judgment, which cannot be
appealed to the next judicial level so long as issues remain
undetermined.

So long as the agency's order reserves anything to

the agency for further decision, it is not a final order. Sloan
Board of Review,
4.

v.

781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Not being a final order, the petition for the Commission

to review it could not have been tardy.
5.

While the commission acknowledges that the amount of

recovery is a factor in determining attorney fee reasonableness,
its Order Denying Review fails to expressly consider what effect
the amount of recovery had in this case. See Order Denying Review,
page seven.
6.

Attorney fees could not have been awarded and cannot be

evaluated for reasonableness with the case in its current posture,
since the amount of principal recovery has not been calculated, nor
2

can it be calculated based on the any order the Commission has
entered to date.
7. The Commission erred (Order Denying Review, page eight) in
announcing how the damages could be calculated. It did so based on
assumptions about voluntariness of McCord's losses, without basing
the observation on any finding by the ALJ to that effect. Damages
simply

cannot

be

calculated

without

further

hearing

and

supplemental findings.
5. The Commission failed to consider the leading cases on the
issues involved, particularly whether McCord can be said to have
been treated "as if" she were "handicapped.11
City

v.

Confer,

Board of Review,
of Review,

See, e.g. Salt

674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Grace Drilling

Lake
Co.

v.

776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989) and Hurley v. Board

767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).

For all of the above reasons, Maverik requests that the
Commission reconsider in full its Order Denying Review.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March, 1992.

R'on&ld C. Barker, Mitchell R.
Barker and David C Cundick
Attorneys for Defendant Maverik
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 1992, I caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage
prepaid to:
James E. Stewart
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 44580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Benjamin A. Sims
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX C
February 28, 1992, Order Denying Review

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UADD CASE NO. 89-0031
VICKY ANN MCCORD,
Applicant,
vs.

*

*
*

ORDER DENYING
REVIEW

•

MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE,

*

Defendants.
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for
Review of the administrative law judged Order dated June 26, 1991
which was submitted by respondents. The authority for. review is
conferred by U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11), and Section 63-46b-12.
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24,
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24,
1991.
Respondent requested a formal hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10,
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and
September 10, 1991.
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order,
and could not therefore contest its provisions.
The relevant facts are as follows. Ms. McCord was hired as a
clerk by the Maverik Country Stores on September 30, 1988. She was
interviewed and hired by Ms. Connie Jones, the store manager. Ms.
McCord worked eight six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35
per hour during her two weeks of part-time employment. (Exhibit A17) . She performed cashiering, bookkeeping, customer service, and
stocking shelves.
She had answered "no" to respondent's employment application
question which asked her "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap
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which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are
applying?" However, Ms. McCord had been diagnosed with a heart
condition called "mitral valve prolapse" while- living in California
in January 1988 after she had tightness in her chest and a racing
heartbeat. Ms. McCord related that her doctor had informed her
that the condition required no changes in lifestyle or employment.
She was prescribed a "beta blocker," and she had no further
difficulties.
Both parties stipulated that, among others, "mitral valve
prolapse is a common and usually benign heart condition...." Dr.
Ace Madsen examined Ms. McCord after her termination, and
determined that she was "not at risk because of her heart problems
in regard to her working at her job." Exhibits A-ll, A-7.
While working on October 14, 1988, Ms. McCord experienced some
tightness in her chest and grew increasingly uncomfortable. She
asked her supervisor, Ms. Jones, if she could go to the hospital to
get her heart checked. Ms. McCord disclosed her mitral valve
prolapse condition to Ms. Jones in response to questions.
While Ms. McCord was at the hospital, Ms. Jones checked Ms.
McCord's application for employment. No heart condition had been
noted by Ms. McCord. The doctor at the hospital indicated that Ms.
McCord's heart was fine, but gave her a prescription for a change
of beta blocker. Although Ms. McCord called about two hours later,
and offered to complete the shift, Ms. McCord was told to stay home
and rest.
It is not clear where the termination of employment took
place. There is some dispute about whether the termination took
place over the telephone or at the store, but Ms. McCord was
apparently called or summoned to the store by Ms. Jones on the same
day as the hospital episode. During several of the discussions
between Ms. Jones and Ms. McCord which took place on that day, Ms.
Jones stated that her mother had died from heart problems, and her
son had recently had open heart surgery. During the termination
discussion, Ms. Jones expressed concern about the seriousness of
Ms. McCord's heart problems. Ms. Jones then asked Ms. McCord why
she did not disclose the heart condition on her application. Ms.
McCord replied that she believed that it presented no restrictions
on her, and that she did not consider it to be life threatening.
Ms. Jones responded that she (Ms. Jones) would be afraid to leave
Ms. McCord in the store alone. She then terminated Ms. McCord's
employment.
A Record of Employee Counseling form was completed by Ms.
Jones which describes the circumstances of Ms. McCord's termination
in a typewritten attachment.
Exhibit A-4.
This form and
attachment show that Ms, Jones was greatly concerned about Ms.
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McCord's heart problem, and the potential that Ms. McCord would
have another medical episode under the stress created if she
continued employment at Maverik. Ms. Jones wrote that ,fI then told
her it would be best if she looked for other less stressful
employment.fl Id.
Ms. Jones stated in response to an inquiry from the UADD
during its investigation that "The day I terminated Vicki it was
due to many things, all relating to her inability to handle stress
on the job and do her job accurately...." Exhibit A-5. Again, it
appears that Ms. Jones was focusing in on the stress factor.
At the hearing, some additional factors for termination were
discussed: 1) Ms. McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump
meters; and, 2) allegations that customers and employees had
complained about smelling alcohol on Ms. McCord's breath during
work. Ms. McCord denied using alcohol before working, and Ms.
Jones and another employee testified that Ms. McCord/s cash
register till was accurate.
Significantly, none of these
allegations were discussed during the termination interview, or
were written on the termination form or attachment.
There is no question that Ms. Jones had the authority from
Maverik to hire and fire Ms. McCord.
Ms. McCord testified and introduced evidence that after her
termination she attempted to find employment at 26 employment
locations during 1989-1991. Exhibit A-8. She worked for a short
time as a janitor at an elementary school from November 1988
through January 1989. Although there was some testimony that
Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements about Ms. McCord
to other persons in the Vernal area, the ALJ found no direct
evidence that Maverik or its employees had ever interfered with Ms.
McCord/s ability to seek other employment.
The ALJ then concluded as a matter of law that "Maverik
Country Stores engaged in a prohibited employment practice under
Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord." The ALJ based this
conclusion on Maverik's perception of Ms. McCord as handicapped.
There was no evidence that McCord's actual physical
condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical or mental impairment, but it was 'treated as
constituting such a limitation,' ... and further, did
'substantially limit major life activities only as a
result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment. . . .'
Order, ALJ at 6 (June 26, 1991), citations omitted.
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The ALJ further stated in her application of facts to her
conclusions of law that Ms. McCord was otherwise qualified to
perform the work.
The ALJ then ordered the following in favor of Vicky Ann
McCord and against Maverik Country Stores:
1.
Liability for a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice in the nature of handicap discrimination.
2. An order to Maverik to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practices.
3. Full relief to Ms. McCord including reinstatement to
employment in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with
full rights, privileges and protections of employment.
4. Payment of back pay calculated at $80.40 per week for
24 hours per week with the period of back pay running from the date
of termination through June 26, 1991 with increases in pay
commensurate with increases in the federal minimum wage effective
April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to
$4.25 per hour, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim
employment.
5. An order to Maverik to take such affirmative action
as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from its environment any
employment discrimination prohibited by law.
6. No retaliation by Maverik against Ms. McCord for
having exercised her right to file this action.
7. Payment of a reasonable attorney's fee by Maverik to
counsel for Ms. McCord.
8.
Maverik was to take any other applicable and
reasonable relief as may be necessary to restore Ms. McCord to her
rightful position.
9. And, finally, a notice that any Motion for Review of
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 30 days of June 26,
1991, specifying in detail the particular errors and objections,
and that the order would be final and not subject to review or
appeal unless such a filing were made.

VICKY MCCORD
ORDER
PAGE FIVE
ISSUE ONE
WHETHER MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES
TIMELY FILED ITS MOTIONS FOR REVIEW?
The ALJ issued her initial Order on June 26, 1991. She then
issued a supplemental order dealing only with attorney's fees on
September 10, 1991. The Request for Review by Maverik was received
by the IC on October 11, 1991. This request was not received
within the 30 days after issuance of the initial order on June 26,
1991, as required by U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(l)(a), and good cause
for the delay has not been shown by Maverik under U.C.A. Section
63-46b-l(9). The latter statute states:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review.
Thus, the order of June 26, 1991 cannot be reviewed by the IC, and
therefore becomes the final order of the IC with regard to the
issues addressed within it. U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11)(b).
With regard to the order of September 10, 1991 which related
to attorney's fees, the filing by Maverik of its Request for Review
was mailed by it on October 10, 1991, and was received by the IC on
October 11, 1991. R486-1-4-5 (Utah Admin. Code) requires that a
request for review be submitted in accordance with U.C.A. Section
63-46b-12.
Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) requires an aggrieved party to:
File a written request for review within 30 days
after the issuance of the order with the person
or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule.
The operative portions of the statute above are "file a
written request for review within 30 days...with the person..." and
"after issuance of the order...." Since issuance of the order is
the first in the sequence of events which triggers the 30 day
period, the nature of issuance must be determined.
There is little case law construing the meaning of issuance,
but what little there is indicates that issuance of an order is
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synonymous with delivery or mailing. Sunnvside Nurseries, Inc. v.
Agri. Labor Relations Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155, 93 C A . 3 d 922.
The Order of the ALJ shows that it was mailed on September 10,
1991. Therefore, the issuance took place on that date.
It has been suggested that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(URCP), Rule 6(e) gives the aggrieved party an extra three days to
file.
This reliance is misplaced since Section 63-46b-12(1)(a)
clearly establishes the timing standard for this administrative
process.
Since Maverik's Request for Review was received on October 11,
1991, that is the date of filing. That date was on the 31st day
after issuance, and was not timely. However, the IC will discuss
the remaining issues as raised by Maverik for the benefit of the
parties.
ISSUE TWO
WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS "ERRONEOUSLY
HIGH, AND SHOULD BEAR SOME RELATION
TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT?"
U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) allows the ALJ to, among other
actions, award attorneys7 fees and costs. The ALJ awarded Ms.
McCord's counsel legal fees of $19,731, and awarded Ms. McCord
$1,536.26 for costs in connection with her claim before the IC.
Maverik asserted the issue of whether the fees were
"erroneously high, and should bear some relation to the damages
sought" in its Revised Memorandum Opposing Attorney Fee Award which
was received by the ALJ on August 13, 1991. Ms. McCord's legal
counsel had sought $25,400.50 which was claimed to represent the
work of three attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec, and Diane
Abbeglen, at the hourly rates of $125, $80, and $80, respectively.
The ALJ reduced the fees to the amount noted in the immediately
preceding paragraph.
The ALJ correctly used the factors to both award and to reduce
the award based on case law which identified the following key
factors to consider in awarding attorney's fees: relationship of
the fee to the amount recovered, novelty and difficulty of the
issues, overall result achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit
to vindicate rights, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case,
customary fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of
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the attorneys involved.
10, 1991).

Supplemental Order of the ALJ, at 2 (Sep.

Maverik asserts that Ms. McCord will recover approximately
$8,000, and that the attorneys fees are excessive when that
recovery is considered. The amount in controversy is a factor
only, and it generally takes as much time to try a discrimination
case for an employee making a minimum wage as it does to try one
for a supervisor receiving much more compensation. Cf. Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); Cabrera v.
Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985).
Considering all relevant factors, we cannot say that the
amount awarded was excessive based on the ALJ's reasoning to the
effect that this hearing required one full day; that the attorneys
for Ms. McCord carefully documented their hourly charges; that Ms.
McCord had to initiate the hearing to vindicate her rights since
Maverik did not acknowledge its liability notwithstanding the cause
finding issued by the UADD; that the result obtained by Ms.
McCord's counsel who were knowledgeable and competent in employment
discrimination law was successful, and that the fees charged were
within the customary range for the Salt Lake City legal community.
Since Ms. McCord's counsel have not challenged the reduction
of their fees, we will not discuss the reduction except to note
that we find the reduction to be reasonable and appropriate.
For the above reasons, we find the attorney/s fees awarded to
Ms. McCord7s attorneys to be appropriate in light of the
documentation, expertise and work required in her case.
ISSUE THREE
WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN
FAILING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT
OF DAMAGES?
Maverik styled its issue as stated in the heading above, but
more specifically at page 2 of its request asked whether the ALJ
abused her discretion in awarding Ms. McCord lost wages for time
periods "after she acquired a better paying job, which she later
quit?"
It is appropriate to award back pay from the date of the
discrimination until the date of judgement or the date of trial.
Gathercole v. Global Associates, 560 F.Supp. 642, 647 (1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 727 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1984); Wells v. North
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Carolina Bd of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983)
cert, den. 464 U.S. 1044, 79 L.ed 2d 176, 14 S.Ct. 712. The ALJ
awarded back pay in this instance from the date of termination
until the date of her order.
Federal law governs the award of back pay in other types of
discrimination cases, but is instructive in this case. 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e-5. The purpose of an award of back pay is to make
the party whole for injuries suffered through discrimination. The
employer is not responsible for losses willingly incurred by Ms.
McCord. Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985) . We can find nothing in the file which shows that
Ms. McCord willingly incurred any loss.
When she left her
employment at the elementary school, she did so due to illness
beyond her control. The ALJ correctly required only an offset by
reducing Ms. McCord's award by all earnings from interim
employment, including her elementary school job.
We therefore find that the ALJ was correct in law and fact in
light of the entire record.
ISSUE FOUR
DID THE ALJ ERR WHEN SHE
FOUND THAT MAVERIK HAD TREATED
MS. MCCORD AS IF SHE WERE HANDICAPPED?
Maverik asserts that the ALJ erred when she found that Maverik
had treated Ms. McCord as if she were handicapped. The ALJ found
that "Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of
McCord as handicapped." Order of the ALJ, at 6 (June 26, 1991).
Maverik now claims that Ms. McCord is not handicapped since mitral
valve prolapse is a common condition usually accompanied by no
symptoms at all. Trial Brief as incorporated into the Request for
Review, Maverik Country Stores, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1991).
This issue is relevant as it relates to U.C.A. Section 34-356(1)(a)(i) which states in pertinent part:
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice:
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or
to discharge, demote, terminate any person, . . .
because of ... handicap ....
The Utah statutes do not discuss the concept of perceived
handicap. However, R486-1-2 (Utah Admin. Code) was promulgated by
the UADD under the authority of U.C.A. 34-35-5(b), and provides
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that the subject individual will be treated as if he or she has a
handicap where the individual:
Has a record of such an impairment •.. or has
been regarded as having, a mental or physical
impairment
R486-1-2F5 (Utah Admin. Code).
The Utah Administrative Code further provides that the
individual may be regarded as having a handicap if others think
that he or she has such a disability, or is considered by others to
have a limitation on a major life activity. R486-l-2F6a,b,c (Utah
Admin. Code). A person who has no disability or handicap, but who
is treated by others as if he or she is impaired (perception of
impairment) , may be just as impaired by virture of treatment by
others as one who is actually impaired.
The ALJ correctly found that the termination was due to Ms.
McCord's employer7s perception of her as handicapped, and that she
was otherwise qualified to perform the work. Finally, her employer
made no attempt to obtain medical advice as to the perceived
handicap, or whether she could reasonably accommodate Ms. McCord's
perceived medical condition.
We therefore conclude that this asserted issue by Maverik is
without merit, and that the ALJ was correct.
ISSUE FIVE
WHETHER THE ALJ INCORRECTLY
FOUND THAT ANY PERCEIVED
ABNORMALITY CONSTITUTES
A PERCEIVED HANDICAP?
It is clear to us that the ALJ did not find that any perceived
abnormality constitutes a perceived handicap. Maverik misstates
the findings of the ALJ. A finding of abnormality is not required.
Whatever impairment exists must be either a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of a persons
major life activities, U.C.A. Section 34-35-3(9), and where the
impairment does not actually exist either in part or in whole, the
perception must also rise to the level of substantially limiting
one or more of a person's major life activities.
Major life activity is defined as including experiencing
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment
,f
because of a handicap
R486-1-2F3 (Utah Admin. Code).
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A person is regarded as having an impairment when he or she
(a) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities, but is treated as constituting such a
limitation; (b) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the
attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (c) has none of
the impairments listed in the definition of physical or mental
impairment above, but is treated as having such an impairment.
R486-1-2F6 (Utah Admin. Code).
Here, Maverik terminated Ms. McCord based on its perception of
the severity of Ms. McCord's medical condition.
Ms. McCord's
condition was probably not an impairment, but her condition was
treated as a serious one by Maverik.
A job is a major life
activity, including clerking at a convenience store, and there is
a legal requirement to reasonably accommodate such employees unless
undue hardship can be shown.
For the above reasons, we conclude that the ALJ met the
requirements of law in light of the whole record.
ISSUE SIX
WHETHER A MEDICAL EXPERT IS
REQUIRED TO TESTIFY BEFORE
A FINDING OF HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
CAN BE MADE?
Both parties stipulated before the hearing that mitral valve
prolapse is usually a benign condition, and that Exhibit A-11 would
be "authoritative on the condition of Mitral Valve Prolapse. ...,f
Exhibit A-11.
Having stipulated that this exhibit would be
authoritative as to Ms. McCord's condition, there appears to be no
good reason why a medical expert is required. The question before
the ALJ was not whether Ms. McCord was actually handicapped, but
whether Maverik treated her as if she was disabled. The evidence
is clear that even though Ms. McCord was capable of performing her
job, Maverik's manager perceived her to have a serious heart
problem, and as a result fired her.
No medical expert was required.
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ISSUE SEVEN
WHETHER MS. MCCORD SHOWED THAT
SHE WAS QUALIFIED TO ACT IN THE
JOB?
Maverik contends that Ms. McCord never showed that she was
qualified for the job from which she was terminated. At the time
of Ms. McCord's termination she was told that she was terminated
because of her heart condition. It was only after the termination,
and after an investigation was requested by the UADD, that Maverik
gave any other reasons for Ms. McCord's termination.
While working at Maverik, Ms. McCord's supervisor was
confident enough in her abilities to leave her alone to perform her
duties in the store after only three days of training. Ms. Jones,
her supervisor, had never confronted Ms. McCord with any of the
allegations which were subsequently lodged against her after the
termination. In fact, Ms. McCord was scheduled to work on the day
of her termination alone for most of her shift.
At the hearing, Maverik alleged that Ms. McCord was not
otherwise qualified because of problems she had reading the gas
pumps. However, a witness who worked for Maverik testified that
everyone had problems reading the pump meters.
Ms. McCord
testified that prior to her termination she had learned to read the
meters, and that she had been complimented on her accuracy on the
till.
It is significant that Ms. McCord was apparently performing
her job duties properly until the time that she asked to go to the
hospital, and that her qualifications had not been questioned up to
that point.
This alleged error is therefore without merit, and we find
that the ALJ determinations and conclusions were correct.
CONCLUSION
For all the previous reasons, we find that the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Administrative Law Judge
were correct in law and fact in view of substantial evidence in the
whole record.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the orders of the administrative law judge
dated June 26, 1991, and September 10, 1991 are affirmed.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.
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VICKY ANN MCCORD,
Applicant,
LIMITED REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION
vs.
, Case Number: UADD 89-0031
MAVERIK COUNTY STORES,
i
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Respondent,
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission
reconsider

its denial of Maverik f s request that the Commission

lengthen its time within which to file any motion for review by the
Commission of the Supplemental Order of the Administrative
Judge, which was issued on or about September 10, 1991.

Law
This

request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code, and is
limited to a request for review of the denial of an extension of
time.

i

The grounds for relief from the Order are:
1.

The procedural

events

in this matter

to date are

as

follows:
a.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was issued,

reserving

attorney

fee issue for later determination, June 26,

1991.
b.

Supplemental

Order

awarding

approximately

$20,000

in

attorney fees and costs issued by the Administrative Law Judge,
September 10, 1991.
c.

Request for Review prepared and mailed October 10, 1991

but not received by the Commission until October 15, 1991 (the day
after Columbus Day).
d.

Industrial Commission issues Order Denying Review, finding

in part that Maverik's Motion for Review was untimely, February 28,
1992.
e. Maverik files Request for Reconsideration, March 19, 1992,
including therein a Motion for an Extension of Time through August
15, 1992 for filing a Petition for Review.
f.

Commission

issues

Order

Denying

Request

for

Reconsideration, including denial of Maverik's request that the
time period with in which to Request Review be extended, March 30,
1992.

2

2.

Good cause has been shown and is further shown herein (see

below) .

The good cause previously shown was the fact that the

document was prepared, executed and mailed on October 10, 1991,
which is the due date by statute.
3. Section 63-46b-l(9), Utah Code, permits lengthening of any
time period for action by the Commission "for good cause shown".
4.

The Commission has, for the first time in its Order

Denying Reconsideration, properly found that the original Order of
the Administrative Law Judge Church was not a final order.

See,

Order

This

Denying

Reconsideration, March

30, 1992, page

2.

changes the entire face of this case and justifies appropriate
review

of

all

the

matters

at

issue.

The

Commission

having

determined the initial order to be non-final, procedural matters
should be set aside for an initial determination on the merits of
the ALJ's original order.
5.

Further good cause for the extremely

short

extension

request that is shown as follows:
a.

Most of the "tardy" days are not chargeable to Maverik

under law.

They include October 12 and 13, weekends, as well as

October 14, Columbus Day.
b.

As pointed out in the Commission's Order Denying Review,

page 5 and 6,

there is little case authority construing what

constitutes "issuance" by the Commission.

3

It is also far from

clear what constitutes "filing" with the Commission-

Because of

these ambiguities and because of the policy of the Commission of
avoiding hyper-formality, extensions should be freely granted when
requested in good faith.
c.

The Supplemental Order for which review was sought by

Maverik was received by "counsel for Maverik on September 11 or 12,
1991, 28 or 29 days prior to the preparation and mailing of the
Petition for Review.
d.
and

At about the time the ALJ issued her Supplemental Order,

just prior to Maverik1s counsel receiving the same, the

undersigned, Mitchell R. Barker, was employed on an emergency basis
to defend a criminal defendant in a jury trial set to start (and
which did start) on September 16, 1991. The case was State
vs.

Stephen

Cartisano

and Challenger

Foundation

II,

of

Utah

90-CR-47, Sixth

Circuit Court, Kane County.
e.

From prior to receipt of the Supplemental Order until

September 17, 1991, Mitchell R. Barker and David C. Cundick, who is
the other attorney who is handling this case and who appeared at
the formal hearing in this matter with Mr. Barker, were both
involved day and night in defense of Stephen Cartisano in that well
publicized trial which was held in Kanab, Utah.

Little time was

taken to eat or sleep, and there was no time to consider items
received in the mail.
4

f.

September

18, 1991, was the first day that Maverik's

counsel were back in the office, after the Cartisano trial ended in
a mistrial.

The Cartisano matter is scheduled to be heard again in

May 1992 after a change of venue to West Valley City.
g.

The undersigned

had another trial on October

3, 1991

before Judge Daniels in Third District Court, along with several
other in Court and out of Court matters during the period

from

September 17, 1991 through October 10, 1991, the date Maverik's
Petition was due and the date it was prepared and mailed.

Those

included several days trying to catch up on office work after the
Cartisano.
h.

On the due date for the Petition, it was not ready and

hand delivered to the Industrial Commission before 5:00

because

virtually the entire day was spent researching and arguing before
Judge Mower of the Sixth Circuit Court in Kane County, on the issue
of Cartisanofs successful Motion to Change Venue from Kane County
to Salt Lake County.
6.

Under Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code, it appears that on the

due date for intra-agency review a request may be mailed rather
than hand filed.

That section states that the request shall "state

the date upon which it was mailed" and "be sent by mail to the
presiding officer and to each party".
1(9), Utah Code.
5

See also Section 63-46b-

7.

This is not a repeat of the prior motion to reconsider, or

a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to reconsider.

An

enlargement of time was first requested on March 19 of this year,
and was denied for the only time on March 30, 1992.
Wherefore, good cause has previously been shown and is here
further shown for the very short extension sought be Maverik to
make its Petition for Review of the 'Supplemental Order timely,
despite the fact that it was mailed on the due date and received
shortly thereafter by the Commission.
DATED this 3rd day of April, 1992.
Mitchell R. Barker
Ronald C Barker
David C. Cundick
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of April, 1992, I caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage
prepaid to:
James W. Stewart
Kay C. Krivanec
JONES, WALDO, KOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Benjamin Sims
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

% ^ •#. i
Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX E
March 30, 1992, Order Denying Request for Reconsideration

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600
VICKY ANN MCCORD,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

*

MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES,
Respondent.

*
*
*

UADD No. 89-0031

*********************************

The request for reconsideration by the respondent in the
above entitled matter to review its Order Denying Review, issued on
February 28, 1992, having been duly considered under the authority
of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-13 (1953 as amended), the request for
reconsideration is denied for the following reasons:
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24,
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24,
1991.
Respondent requested a formal hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10,
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the
Industrial Commission of the ALJ/s orders of June 26, 1991, and
September 10, 1991.
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order,
and could not therefore contest its provisions.
Maverik Country Stores first contends that the Commission has
erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-l(9) to make the filing of
Maverik/s Petition for Review untimely, and to avoid exercise of
the Commissions discretion in extending any such deadline. This
section states:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
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shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review.
(Emphasis added).
This statute allows a presiding officer to lengthen or shorten
a time period based upon good cause shown. Maverik did not ask the
Commission to lengthen its time period based on good cause shown,
nor did it show any good cause for doing so. As can be seen by its
clear strictures, it applies only to agency review, and not to
judicial review as asserted by Maverik.
We therefore reject
Maverik's first issue.
Next, Maverik asks for a one day extension to petition for
review by the Commission. Again, this request must be rejected
based on failure of Maverik to show good cause.
Third, Maverik states that the ALJ order of June 26, 1991 was
not final since issues were specifically reserved in the order and
damages were not calculated.
Upon further review, we agree that
the June 26, 1991 order was not final because the issue of attorney fees was reserved by the following language:
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney1s fees award, pending
this Order, and shall address that in supplemental briefs to the Commission.
Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991).
Notwithstanding this concession, Maverik did not meet the
statutory deadline for filing a request for review of the final
order which addressed attorney fees issued on September 10, 1991 by
the ALJ. Again, Maverik has shown no good cause as to why the
Commission should extend the filing time.
Maverik also contends that the order could not have been final
because damages were not calculated. It cites Sloan v. Board of
Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989) for this proposition. We find
that the order of the ALJ was explicit enough to calculate damages
since Ms. McCord was awarded, among other provisions, reinstatement
to employment, and back pay, at the rates specified on page eight
of the ALJ order, from the date of unlawful termination until the
date of the ALJ order, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim
employment. Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). The offsets are
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listed on page eight of the order, and the date of termination,
among other findings of fact, are shown on pages two through five.
The monetary damages can thus be reasonably calculated.
The remaining allegations of error were addressed in the
Motion of Review of defendant dated October 15, 1991, and the
Commission again finds them nonmeritorius.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that
defendant is dismissed.

the

Request

for

Reconsideration

of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-4 6b-16. The requesting party shall
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Certified this o ^ ^ d a y of

^ZhMi^l^

1992

Patricia O. Ashbyf
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage the
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on Vicky Ann McCord, Case
No. 89-0031 on 30 March 1992 to the following:
Mitchell R. Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
James E. Stewart
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Utah Court of Appeals
Case No. 910413-CA

X
S 0^__^ \^x*vl_

BENJAMIN A- SIMS

APPENDIX F
June 26, 1991, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UADD Case No, 89-0031

VICKY ANN MCCORD,
Charging Party,
vs.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City/ Utah on May 15,
1991, at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Charging Party was present and represented by
James W. Stewart, Attorney at Law.
The Respondent was present and
Mitchell Barker, Attorney at Law.

represented

by

This is a claim of discrimination based on handicapped status
brought by Vicky McCord against Maverik Country Stores in
connection with her termination of employment. The Charge was
filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division on October 24,
1988. The Division issued its Determination on January 24, 1991
finding that Respondent had violated the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act of 1965, as amended, and issued an Order on the same date
requiring Respondent to conciliate the issue. On February 15,
1991, Respondent requested a formal hearing before the Commission
on the Charge, and the request was granted.
A de novo evidentiary hearing was held, during which sworn
testimony and exhibits were presented.
During the hearing,
several rulings were made from the bench, including a denial of
Respondent's oral Motion for Summary Judgment at the close of
Charging Party's case. The Administrative Law Judge also found
that Respondent's corporate officials received adequate notice of
the Charge and subsequent investigation through copies to the
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corporate office. Respondent argued that a handwritten notation by
an unidentified person of "no cause determination" on a letter
dated February 6, 1991 constituted a finding of no cause by UADD
(Exhibit A-16), but the Administrative Law Judge ruled that the
UADD's actual Determination, dated January 24, 1991, was the only
binding agency action on the merits.
The parties expressly
reserved the right to brief the question of attorney's fees
following the issuance of an Order on the merits.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge and the
parties were given time to submit simultaneous closing briefs.
Having received said briefs, and having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Vicky Ann McCord (McCord) was hired as a clerk by Maverik
Country Store on September 30, 1988. She was interviewed and hired
by Maverik's Store Manager, Connie Jones (Jones.) Jones had the
authority to hire and fire employees on behalf of Maverik, based on
her testimony and that of her supervisors. McCord/s position was
part-time, working six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35 per
hour. She worked eight shifts during her two weeks of employment,
Exhibit A-17. She was trained by Jones and another employee, Suzie
Jenkins (Jenkins.)
Her duties including cashiering, stocking
shelves, some bookkeeping and customer service.
At the time of hiring, McCord filled out an employment
application (Exhibit A-l), which included a question concerning
physical abilities:
"Do you have any respiratory, circulatory
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap
which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are
applying?" McCord checked the box marked "no."
The evidence demonstrates that McCord had been diagnosed with
a heart condition known as "mitral valve prolapse" during January,
1988, while living in California.
This diagnosis followed an
episode of tightness in her chest and a racing heartbeat. She
consulted a Dr. Watkins, whose opinion is not contained in the
evidence. McCord's recollection of that consultation was that the
condition did not present any restrictions on her lifestyle or
employment.
She was given a "beta blocker" medication and
experienced no further problems.
The Administrative Law Judge takes judicial notice of the
generic information on mitral valve prolapse which was placed into
the record by stipulation of the parties as Exhibit A-ll. Said
information states, in part, that "mitral valve prolapse is a
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common and usually benign heart condition... An estimated 4 percent
to 7 percent of the population has M V P — Because MVP is so common,
some authorities believe that the condition is simply a normal
variant in heart structure, rather than a disease as such."
Evidence was also submitted from Dr. Ace Madsen, who examined
McCord after her termination, stating that McCord "is not at risk
because of her heart problems in regard to her working at her job."
(Exhibit A-7) Dr. Madsen further stated that the mitral valve
prolapse problem, "should not interfere with any athletic or work
related endeavors."
On October 14, 1988, McCord reported for her shift at noon.
Jones was working in the store office. McCord began working but
felt some tightness in her chest and grew increasingly
uncomfortable. She asked Jones if she could leave the store and go
to the hospital to get her heart checked. In response to Jones'
questions, she disclosed the mitral valve prolapse condition.
Jones agreed to allow her time off to seek medical attention.
At the hospital, McCord was examined and her heart was
monitored (Exhibit A-18.) McCord testified that the emergency room
doctor indicated her heart was fine, and suggested a change of her
"beta blocker" medication. After giving her a new prescription, he
released her to return to work.
While McCord was at the hospital, Jones referred to McCord's
application and noted that no heart condition had been disclosed.
Jones later called the hospital to check on McCord, and could not
obtain any information. McCord called Jones approximately two
hours later and offered to resume her shift. Jones told her to
stay home and rest. Jones then called McCord back and told her she
needed to come in to the store and discuss the situation with
Jones. McCord grew apprehensive and asked why. Jones stated that
she would prefer not to discuss the matter on the telephone, but
she went on to say that Jones' mother had died from heart problems,
and her son had recently had heart surgery. Jones commented that
she was concerned about the seriousness of McCord's heart problem.
The parties dispute whether or not McCord then came into the
store for a subsequent discussion with Jones, or whether the
termination of employment took place by telephone.
In either
event, a discussion was had between Jones and McCord later that day
concerning McCord's heart condition. Jones asked McCord why she
did not disclose the heart condition on her application. McCord
responded that she did not believe it presented any restrictions on
her performance of the job, and she did not consider it lifethreatening. Jones then reiterated her statements about Jones'
mother and son having heart problems, and stated she would be
afraid to leave McCord in the store alone. McCord stated that she
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did not perceive her condition to be as serious as that of Jones'
mother or son. Jones then terminated McCord/s employment with
Maverik, stating that she would "do better somewhere else.11
On the same day, Jones prepared a Record of Employee
Counseling form as required by Maverik policy (Exhibit A-4) which
states that McCord was terminated, and described the circumstances
in an attached handwritten letter. That letter states in part:
I told her I would worry about her being on the job
alone. She said it would not happen again and I then
told her how could she make that guarantee when she had
to leaver earlier and said she would not remain on the
job.
I also told her my sympathies were with her as my son had
had open heart surgury (sic) July 1st and my mom had died
of heart problems and complications following surgery.
At this time I told her she had not mentioned this at the
interview when asked if she had medical problems that
would interfere with her doing her job.
I then told her it would be best if she looked for other
less stressful employment.
Jones testified in the hearing that the reasons she stated in
Exhibits A-4 and A-5 were the actual reasons she made the decision
to terminate McCord. Exhibit A-5 is Jones' response to the AntiDiscrimination Division investigation.
It states in pertinent
part:
The day I terminated Vicki it was due to many things, all
relating to her inability to handle stress on the job and
do her job accurately...
According to Vicki she told me in the office that her
heart problem was sometimes brought on by stress. A
convenience store clerk is under nothing but stress. Not
only is the pace fast, but you are responsible for
stocking, cleaning during your shift, dealing with
customers and running the cash register...
My opinion at the time I terminated Vicki was that both
physically and mentally she would be more comfortable in
a job that had a slower pace.
There was some testimony at the hearing concerning McCord's
job performance. Both Jones and Jenkins testified that McCord had
difficulty reading the gasoline pump meters correctly. McCord
admitted this problem but added that Jones and Jenkins reassured
her that other employees had the same problem during the first few
weeks.
Jenkins and Jones testified that each had customers
complain about the smell of liquor on McCord's breath during work,
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and they smelled it also. Jones stated that she asked McCord on
one occasion if she had been drinking and she denied it* McCord
denied under oath the use of alcohol before working. Jones and
Jenkins testified that McCord was accurate in her cash register
till, and McCord recalled having been complimented on her accuracy.
Despite the above comments, Jones did not mention any claimed
job performance problems with McCord during the termination
discussion. That discussion centered around Jones' perception of
a heart problem.
The Record of Employee Counseling which
documented the termination did not state any other reason for
counseling, although it contained blanks for such reasons as
"intoxication,"
"personal
conduct,"
"unsatisfactory
work
performance," and "violation of company rules." (Exhibit A-4) It
also contains a statement that McCord/s performance was "average."
There is no documentation that Jones ever counseled or disciplined
McCord concerning the performance issues described above.
Substantial testimony was taken on such issues as the other
handicapped employees working for Maverik, and the employment
history of McCord prior to this job, but such matters are deemed
not relevant to the claim of handicapped discrimination.
Respondent's witnesses Robert Child and Dana Dean, both senior
Maverik employees to Jones, testified that Jones did have authority
to hire and fire employees, and that she acted within the scope of
her authority with regard to McCord.
After being terminated by Maverik, McCord pursued other
employment. She testified and introduced evidence showing that she
made application at twenty-six places of employment during 19891991 (Exhibit A-8) . She did briefly work at Ashley Elementary
School as a janitor from November, 1988 through January, 1989. She
anticipates working for the Forest Service this year. There was
also some attenuated testimony at the hearing concerning the
allegation that Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements
of a personal nature about McCord to third persons in the Vernal,
Utah area. There is, however, no direct evidence that Maverik or
its employees ever interfered in McCord's ability to seek other
employment.
Based on the testimony of Jones, it is apparent that Jones
retains some hostile feelings toward McCord. She testified to
making a derogatory personal comment about McCord while waiting to
testify in the hearing. She also admitted during testimony that
she did not consider McCord to be honest nor "a good person."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Utah law provides that it is a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice for an employer to terminate any person,
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otherwise qualified/
because of handicap, U.C.A. 34-35-6.
"Handicap" is defined in the rules promulgated thereunder as "a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one of
more of an individual's major life activities. Being regarded as
having a handicap is equivalent to being handicapped or having a
handicap," R486-1-2(F)(1).
"Major life activity" is defined to include experiencing
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment
because of a handicap," R486-1-2(F) (3) . If,ls regarded as having an
impairment means (a) has a physical or mental impairment that does
not substantially limit major life activities but is treated as
constituting such a limitation; (b) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as
a result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or
(c) has none of the impairments listed in the definition of
physical or mental impairment above but is treated as having such
an impairment," R486-1-2(F)(6).
The statute and regulations further provide that "An employer
shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program,"
R486-1-2(J)(1).
Applying the above law to the facts, the Administrative Law
Judge finds that Maverik Country Stores engaged in a prohibited
employment practice under Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord.
Maverik/s termination of McCord rested on its perception of McCord
as handicapped.
There was no evidence that McCord's actual
physical condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical
or mental impairment, but it was "treated as constituting such a
limitation," R486-1-2(F)(6)fa) and further, did "substantia1lv
limit major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such an impairment," R486-1-2 (F) (6Wc) .
Specifically, Jones' attitude toward persons with heart
conditions was shown to be discriminatory. McCord has met her
burden of proof by showing that she was terminated from employment,
the termination was due to her employer's perception of her as
handicapped, she was otherwise qualified to perform the work (since
no other reason was given for termination at the time it became
effective), and her employer made no attempt or inquiry regarding
possible accommodations. Her employer did not even seek to obtain
medical advice about the perceived handicap — its symptoms,
treatment or how it would affect McCord's job performance — before
making the immediate decision to terminate.
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Maverik asserts that McCord failed to meet her burden because
she is not handicapped, and argues the very limited medical
evidence in support of this position. The Administrative Law Judge
concedes that McCord's condition of mitral valve prolapse in this
instance does not appear to present any impairment to McCord's
ability to perform her job. Nevertheless, the law is clearly aimed
at both actual and perceived handicaps. This is a case where
Manager Jones' perception of handicap (based on Jones' emotional
and unsubstantiated analogy to her own family situation — not on
any medical evidence) was discriminatory in itself.
Maverik also urges the Commission to find that "convenience
store clerking is not a substantial life activity," Respondent's
Closing Brief, p. 6, and therefore, discrimination cannot be found.
Maverik's counsel misses the point of the anti-discrimination laws
and regulations. Mc Cord testified that she pursued permanent
employment with Maverik as a means of supporting herself and her
son.
It would be absurd for the Commission to engage in an
analysis of which types of employment are "career" or "non-career,"
as Respondent argues. "Employment" is clearly listed as a category
in the litany of "major life activities" set forth by Rule, and
McCord's employment was terminated.
Maverik asserts that McCord's performance problems were the
actual reason for termination.
This is not supported by the
evidence.
Manager Jones alone made the decision to terminate
McCord's employment. The best evidence of her basis for this
decision is the contemporaneous document she prepared at the time,
Exhibit A-4, Record of Employee Counseling, and the reasons she
gave McCord in the termination discussion. Both state the reason
as McCord's heart problem, and Jones' non-medical perception that
it was related to job stress. Subsequently, Jones has stated that
factors such as pump reading problems, general nervousness, and
possible drinking contributed to the decision to terminate. Since
none of these was discussed with McCord or documented by Jones
prior to termination and this claim being filed, such suggestions
lack credibility. Further, McCord had only worked at Maverik for
two weeks prior to termination, and there is no indication that
these factors had led Jones to consider termination or even
discipline, until the heart condition became known.
Finally, Maverik claims that McCord is not otherwise qualified
to perform the job. McCord was presumably performing the job up
until the moment she asked for the time to go to the hospital, and
her qualifications had not been questioned at that point. At
termination her performance was rated by Jones as "average." For
Maverik to suggest in hindsight that McCord's qualifications were
lacking begs the question.
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McCord has suffered damages as a result of Maverik's
prohibited employment practice, in that she has been deprived of
wages and benefits of employment. Utah law states that if an
employer is found to have engaged in a prohibited discriminatory
practice, the Commission shall "issue an order requiring the
respondent to cease any discrimination or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the complaining party, including
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorney's fees," U.C.A.
34-35-7.1(9).
Awards of back pay are governed by federal law, 42 U.S.C
2000e-5, and the purpose thereof is to make the party whole for
injuries suffered through discrimination. In this case, back pay
is calculated at a rate of $3.35 per hour for 24 hours per week, or
$80.40 per week. The period of back pay runs from the date of
termination through the date of this Order. While McCord argues
for the use of incremental raises, based on those received by
another employee, the Administrative Law Judge does not find that
probative in McCord's case. The evidence is too speculative to
establish that McCord would have, in fact, qualified for these
incremental raises by passing the tests required.
The
Administrative Law Judge does incorporate by reference the
increases in federal minimum wage, effective April 1, 1990 to $3.80
per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour, for
purposes of calculating the back pay award (Exhibit A-12.)
Respondent asks the Commission to terminate McCord's back pay
award as of the date she secured employment as a janitor for Ashley
Elementary School in November, 1988. This employment lasted only
two months. A review of pertinent case law demonstrates that
victims of discrimination do have a duty to mitigate their back pay
damages by actively seeking other suitable employment, and "Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
back pay otherwise allowable," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). Therefore,
McCord's back pay award must be reduced by all earnings from
interim employment, including Ashley Elementary School.
However, the Ashley Elementary employment does not toll the
period of back pay since McCord's employment there was not
terminated voluntarily. Consistent with case law enunciated in
Bradv v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269 (1985), "the
[back pay] period is tolled when the quit is motivated by personal
reasons unrelated to the job or as a matter of personal
convenience," Id. at 1278. Since McCord was required to quit
Ashley Elementary due to illness beyond her control, that period of
employment should operate as an offset only against the back pay
award.
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McCord argues that front pay ought to be awarded in lieu of
reinstatement with Maverik Country Stores, due to the hostility
shown McCord by Jones and other employees during the pendency of
these proceedings*
The Administrative Law Judge finds that
reinstatement is still an appropriate remedy, given the fact that
Jones no longer works for Maverik, substantial time has passed
since these incidents and presumably, reinstatement could be
arranged in another Maverik location or capacity•
McCord is entitled to the value of employment benefits she has
lost as a result of the discriminatory termination. No proof was
introduced of the specific Maverik benefit programs to which McCord
could have been entitled, and therefore, none can be awarded based
on the evidence in the record.
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney's
fees award, pending this Order, and shall address that in
supplemental briefs to the Commission.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores is found
liable of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice in the
nature of handicap discrimination against Vicky Ann McCord, and
that Maverik Country Stores cease any discriminatory or prohibited
employment practices immediately;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores provide full
relief to Vicky Ann McCord, including reinstatement to employment
in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with full
rights, privileges and protections of employment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay to Vicky
Ann McCord back pay, at the rates specified above, from the date of
unlawful termination until the date of this Order, subject to all
lawful offsets due to interim employment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take such
affirmative action as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from
its environment any employment discrimination prohibited by law;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores not
retaliate against Vicky Ann McCord for having exercised her right
to file this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay a
reasonable attorney's fee to counsel for Vicky Ann McCord, subject
to both parties submitting written legal briefs on this question to
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the Commission; McCord/s counsel shall submit his brief on
attorney/s fees on or before twenty days from the date of this
Order; Maverik's counsel shall submit a response brief, if emy, on
attorney's fees on or before twenty days thereafter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take any
other applicable and reasonable relief as may be necessary to
restore Vicky Ann McCord to her rightful position.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
2^&W

day of

(Jfr.t^J

ATTEST:

f^tur^^

^P 7] <&7* I-

Patricia O. A'shb^
Commission Secretary
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*
*

MAVERIK COU1JTRY STORE,

*

Respondent.

*

SUPPLEMENTAL
ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On June 26, 1991, an Order was issued in the above case,
finding that Maverik Country Store illegally discriminated against
Vicky Ann McCord on the basis of a perceived handicap. The parties
were granted additional time to submit legal briefs on the amount
of legal fees to be awarded to the prevailing party, pursuant to
U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(9). Said briefs and supporting affidavits have
been received and reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge, who now
enters the following Supplemental Order on the sole issue of
attorney's fees.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Charging Party's counsel has made application for $25,400.50
in attorney's fees and $1,536.26 in costs in connection with the
prosecution of this claim. The attorney's fees represent the work
of three attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec and Diane Abbeglen,
at the hourly rates of $125, $80 and $80, respectively. The costs
involve mailing, transcribing, witness costs, phone calls, computer
time and copying.
Respondent opposes the award of the attorney's fees
claimed,
and
alleges
that the fees are overstated
unconscionable.
They note that the entire damage award to
McCord was only in the range of $8,000, and the fee claimed
exceeds that amount.

as
and
Ms.
far

The Administrative Law Judge has carefully reviewed the
pleadings on this issue, and has considered the circumstances of
the case itself, which she heard on behalf of the Commission. She
has also reviewed Utah cases which provide guidance on the award of
attorney's fees, including Travner v. Cushino, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah
1984); Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) and fcixl*
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The attorney's
fees in this case are awarded on the basis of U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(9).
Case law identifies the following key factors to consider In
awarding attorney's fees: relationship of the fee to the amount
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recovered, novelty and difficulty of the issues, overall result
achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights,
Travner, supra, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case,
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, customary
fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved, Cabrera, supra, f,The total amount of attorneys
fees awarded in [a] case cannot be said to be unreasonable just
because it is greater than the amount recovered on the contract,"
Cabrera at 625.
This was a relatively straightforward claim of handicap
discrimination, which required a one-day administrative hearing.
No pre-trial proceedings or pleadings were required. Very limited
discovery was conducted, and the majority of the work for the
attorneys on both sides consisted of preparation for, and
attendance at, the actual hearing. It was necessary for Charging
Party to initiate a formal proceeding to vindicate her rights,
since the Respondent had not acknowledged its liability under the
"cause" finding of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division.
The
overall result obtained by Charging Party's counsel was successful,
and the hourly rate billed by counsel was within the customary
range for the Salt Lake City legal community. Charging Party's
counsel was knowledgeable and competent in the area of employment
discrimination law.
However, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was a lack
of efficiency in presenting the case, and the number of hours spent
on particular pleadings was excessive. A disproportionately large
block of Charging Party's attorneys' time was spent preparing
written closing arguments, and later, preparing the brief on
attorney's fees.
This is regrettable, due to the fact that the Administrative
Law Judge customarily hears only oral closing arguments, but herein
made an accommodation to the parties' request and allowed vritten
closing arguments.
Parties in an administrative hearing are
expected to come to the hearing prepared to make both opening and
closing statements orally at the hearing. Certainly it was not
envisioned that allowing a written, instead of oral, presentation
would increase the Charging Party's total legal costs by a factor
of nearly one-third. Moreover, such charges defeat the purpose of
handling discrimination claims in an administrative forua, where
judicial economy is a priority.
The Administrative Law Judge suspects that both parties could
not resist the urge to ralitigate the hearing itself by submitting
extensive written closing arguments. This is very understandable
in light of both attorneys' conduct during the eight-hour hearing,
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in which objections and arguments continually interrupted the flow
of testimony, and there was a notable lack of cooperation between
counsel on even the smallest evidentiary matters.
The
Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that those circumstances left
the impression that perhaps the hearing testimony needed to be represented in written, summary form, and then re-argued as part of
closing arguments.
Unfortunately, this process required 34.10
hours of Mr. Stewart's time, and 3 6.75 hours of Ms. Krivanec's
time, according to the fee affidavits submitted. That expenditure
of time approaches the amount of hours spent in hearing preparation
itself, and is found to be excessive.
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party's
counsel in connection with the written closing arguments are
partially disallowed as follows: of the 34.10 hours spent by Mr.
Stewart on closing arguments, two-thirds (23 hours) are disallowed;
of the 3 6.75 hours spent by Ms. Krivanec on closing arguments, twothirds (24 hours) are disallowed. This leaves Mr. Stewart with
106.10 total compensable hours and Ms. Krivanec with 64.40 total
compensable hours.
The balance of the attorney's fees claimed include substantial
time for preparation of the pleadings on the attorney's fee issue
itself: 37.05 hours of Ms. Abbeglen's time at $80.00/hour «=
$2,960.00.
As can be seen from the hearing transcript, the
Administrative Law Judge was very interested in handling the
attorney's fees issue in the simplest and least costly manner. She
asked the parties if they could stipulate to merely submitting
attorney's fees affidavits following her ruling, and not requiring
a further hearing on that single issue. The parties so agreed, and
again, it was not envisioned that by doing so, nearly $3,000 would
be spent on the preparation of those affidavits.
(Respondent's
counsel matched this lack of restraint by filing two separate legal
briefs contesting the award.)
Claims of attorney's fees are
routine and commonly done by large firms such as Charging Party's
counsel. It should not require more than a few hours of organizing
and tabulating bills.
The affidavits from other attorneys in
similar practices are superfluous in an administrative forum, and
are not necessary unless specifically requested by the ALJ.
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party'•
counsel in connection with the legal fees claim are partially
disallowed as follows: of the 37.05 hours spent by Ms. Abbeglen on
the legal fees claim, two-thirds (25 hours) are disallowed, leaving
16.45 total compensable hours.
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The remainder of Charging Party's legal fees are specificall
found to be reasonable and supported by the evidence, and ar
awarded to Charging Party as a matter of statutory legal right
The costs have been examined closely and all appear to be relate
to the prosecution of this claim- They are not excessive and ver
reasonably necessary for case preparation; therefore, they will b
awarded as claimed.
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge rejects the argumen
that Charging Party's fee is unreasonable because it far exceed
the damage award. Damage awards in employment cases are strictl;
limited to lost wages/benefits, and it is not reasonable to
expec
that Charging Party's counsel could have prepared and litigate*
this case for some fraction of a few thousand dollars.
This i«
especially true in this case, where Respondent's counsel assertec
many frivolous arguments unsupported by tenets of discriminatioi
law. The principles at stake in a discrimination case render ii
more valuable to a Charging Party than a mere dollar figure, ant
attorneys' fees may exceed the actual damages in many employment
cases.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The attorney's fees claim submitted by Charging Party's
counsel is reasonable and supported by the evidence, with the
exception of two-thirds of the hours spent on written closinc
arguments and two-thirds of the hours spent on legal fees
affidavits and briefs. Following such deductions, Respondent shal]
be liable for Charging Party's attorney's fees and costs, pursuant
to U.C.A. 35-34-7.1(9).
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Kaverik Country Store,
pay the legal fees of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, ir
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before this
Commission, in the amount of $19,731.00.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent, Kaverik Country Store,
pay the legal costs of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, in
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before thii
Commission, in the amount of §1,536.26.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be fil#d in writing within thirty (30) days of the
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date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors aobjections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and n<
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Lav Judge
Certified on this /fl-frO

day of (^+"£1^*^)

ATTEST:

P a t r i c i a O. Ashby (
CoiuiTiission S e c r e t a r y -
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presiding officer on the motion to set aside the
default
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun
by a party that has other parties besides the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after
issuing the order of default, conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the
party in default and shall determine all issues in
the adjudicative proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no
parties other than the agency and the party in
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding 1968
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review
of an order b> the agency or by a superior agency,
the aggrieved party may file a written request
for review within 30 days after the issuance of
the order with the person or entity designated for
that purpose by the statute or rule
<b> The request shall
(D be signed by the party seeking review,
(n) state the grounds for review and the
relief requested,
(in) state the date upon which it was
mailed and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer
and to each partv
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time period provided
by agenc> rule whichever is longer an> party may
file a response with the person designated by statute
or rule to receive the response One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and
to the presiding officer
»31 If a statute or the agency s rules require review
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the
agency or superior agency shall review the order
within a reasonable time or within the time required
by statute or the agency's rules
(41 To assist in review, the agency or superior
agencv may by order or rule permit the parties to file
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
all parties
<6i ta> Within a reasonable time after the filing of
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or
within the time required by statute or applicable
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
written order on review
(b) The order on review shall be 6igned by the
agency head or by a person designated by the
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party
(c) The order on review shall contain
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review,
(n) a statement of the issues reviewed,
(in >findingsof fact as to each of the issues
reviewed,
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the
issues reviewed,
(v) the reasons for the disposition,
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding
officer or agency 16 to be affirmed, reversed,
or modified, and whether all or any portion

63-46b-15

of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded,
(vn) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved parties, and
(vin) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review
isse
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 day6 after the date that an order
is issued for which review by the agency or b\ a
supenor agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a
written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute the
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to
each party by the person making the request
(3) (a) The agency head or a person designated for
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting
the request or denying the request
(b) If the agency head or the person designated
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20
days after the filing of the request the request
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de
nied

i»88

63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited by statute
(2 > A party may seek judicial review onl\ after exhausting all administrative remedies available except that
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required,
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or
all administrative remedies if
d) the administrative remedies are made
quate, or
(n) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after
the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have
been issued under Subsection 63-46b 13<3nb)
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
other appropriate parties as respondents and
shall meet the form requirements specified in
this chapter
ims
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
review by tnal de novo all final agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile court shall have
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating
to removal or placement decisions regarding children in state custody
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presiding officer on the motion to set aside the
default.
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun
by a party that has other parties besides the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after
issuing the order of default, conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the
party in default and shall determine all issues in
the adjudicative proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no
parties other than the agency and the party in
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding lsee
63-46b-12. A g e n c y review — Procedure.
(1J (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to an> adjudicative proceeding to seek reviev*
of an order b> the agency or by a superior agency,
the aggrieved party may file a written request
for review within 30 days after the issuance of
the order with the person or entity designated for
that purpose by the statute or rule
(b> The request shall
(I) be signed by the party seeking review,
(II) state the grounds for review and the
relief requested,
(III) state the date upon which it was
mailed, and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer
and to each part\
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for reviev*. or within the time period provided
bv agenc> rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute
or rule to receive the response One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and
to the presiding officer
<31 If a statute or the agency's rules require review
of an order b> the agency or a superior agency, the
agenc> or superior agency shall review the order
within a reasonable time or within the time required
bv statute or the agency's rules
(4> To assist in review, the agency or superior
agenc\ ma> by order or rule permit the parties to file
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
all parties
(6) ia> Within a reasonable time after the filing of
an\ response, other filings, or oral argument, or
within the time required by statute or applicable
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
written order on review
(b) The order on review shall be 6igned by the
agency head or by a person designated by the
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party
(c) The order on review shall contain
(I) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review,
(II) a statement of the issues reviewed,
(113 > findings of fact as to each of the issues
reviewed,
(iv) conclusions of law a6 to each of the
issues reviewed,
(v) the reasons for the disposition,
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding
officer or agency 16 to be affirmed, reversed,
or modified, and whether all or any portion

63-46b-15

of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded,
(vn) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved parties, and
(vi»> the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
ises
63-46b-I3. Agency review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order
is issued for which review by the agency or b\ a
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a
written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested
(b) Unless otherwise provided b\ statute the
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed
with the agenc> and one copy shall be sent b\ mail to
each party by the person making the request
(3) (a) The agency head or a person designated for
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting
the request or denying the request
(b) If the agency head or the person designated
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20
days after the filing of the request the request
for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied
1988
63-46b-14.

Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
( D A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited b> statute
(2> A party ma> seek judicial review onl> after exhausting all administrative remedies available except that
(a) a party seeking judicial review, need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required,
(b) the court may relieve a part> seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust an> or
all administrative remedies if
(I) the administrative remedies are inadequate, or
(II) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after
the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13'3)(b)
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
other appropriate parties as respondents and
shall meet the form requirements specified in
thus chapter
10a*
63-4€b-15.

Judicial review — Informal adjudi-

cative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
review by tnal de novo all final agencv actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile court shall have
jurisdiction over all state agencv actions relating
to removal or placement decisions regarding children in state custody

63-46b-16
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall include
(1) the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review,
(n) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency,
(m) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed together with a duplicate copy, summary, or bnef description of
the agency action,
(iv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action,
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding,
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review
(vn) a request for relief, specifying the
type and extent of relief requested,
(vin) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed b> the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure
(3) (a) The district court without a jurv, shall determine all questions of fact and law and an>
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section
iwo
63-46b-16.

Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record,
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record
d) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record, or
(n) according to any other provision of
law
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basi6 of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied,
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute,
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution,
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law,
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure,
(0 the persons taking the agenc> action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification,
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi
nation of fact, made or implied b> the agenc>,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court,
(h) the agency action is
d) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute
(n) contrary to a rule of the agency,
(m) contrary to the agency s prior practice unless the agenc\ justifies the inconsistency b> giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious 1966
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica
tive proceedings by the district court or the re
view of formal adjudicative proceedings b> an appellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressh authorized by statute
(b) In granting relief, the court mav
d) order agenc\ action required b> law
(n) order the agencv to exercise its discretion as required by law
(in) set aside or modify agenc\ action,
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action, or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable b> a higher court,
if authorized by statute
1987
63-46b-18.

Judicial review — Stay and other
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a sta> of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency 8
order of demal shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that
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counsel of record or by a party who is not represented
by counsel
Rule 22. Computation and enlargement of time.
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed by these rules, by an order of
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the
act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included The
last day of the period shall be included, unless it is a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which
event the period extends until the end of the next day
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday
When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less
than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes
days designated as holidays by the state or federal
governments
(b) Enlargement of time. The court for good cause
shown ma) upon motion enlarge the time prescribed
b\ these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may
permit an act to be done after the expiration of such
time, but the court may not enlarge the time for filing
a notice of appeal or a petition for review from an
order of an administrative agency, except as specifically authorized by la* A motion for an enlargement
of time shall be filed prior to the expiration of the
time for which the enlargement is sought A motion
for enlargement of time shall
(1) State with particularity the reasons for
granting the motion,
(2) State whether the movant has previously
been granted an enlargement of time and, if so,
the number and duration of such enlargements,
(3) State when the time will expire for doing
the act for which the enlargement of time is
sought, and
(4) State the date on which the act for which
the enlargement of time is sought will be completed
(c) Ex parte motion. Except as to enlargements of
time for filing and service of briefs under Rule 26(a),
a part> may file one ex parte motion for enlargement
of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of
time has been previously granted, if the time has not
alread} expired for doing the act for which the enlargement is sought, and if the motion otherwise complies with the requirements and limitations of paragraph (b> of this rule
id) Additional time after service by mail.
Whenever a party is required or permitted to do an
act within a prescribed period after service of a paper
and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added
to the prescribed period
Rule 23. Motions.
*a> Content of motion; response; reply. Unless
another form is elsewhere prescribed by these rules,
an application for an order or other relief shall be
made by filing a motion for such order or relief with
proof of service on all other parties The motion shall
contain or be accompanied by the following
( D A specific and clear statement of the relief
sought,
(2) A particular statement of the factual
grounds,
(3) If the motion is for other than an enlargement of time, a memorandum of points and authorities in support, and
(4) Affidavits and papers, where appropriate

Rule 24

Any party may file a response in opposition to a
motion within 10 day6 after service of the motion,
however, the court may, for good cause shown, dispense with, shorten or extend the time for responding
to any motion
(b) Determination of motions for procedural
orders. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph
(a) of this rule as to motions generally, motions for
procedural orders which do not substantially affect
the rights of the parties or the ultimate disposition of
the appeal, including any motion under Rule 22(b),
may be acted upon at any time, without awaiting a
response Pursuant to rule or order of the court, motions for specified types of procedural orders may be
disposed of by the clerk The court may review a disposition by the clerk upon motion of a party or upon
its own motion
(c) Power of a single justice or judge to entertain motions. In addition to the authority expressly
conferred by these rules or by law, a single justice or
judge of the court may entertain and may grant or
deny any request for relief which under these rules
may properly be sought by motion, except that a single justice or judge may not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or other proceeding, and except
that the court may provide by order or rule that anv
motion or class of motions must be acted upon by the
court The action of a single justice or judge ma\ be
reviewed by the court
(d) Form of papers; number of copies.
(1) Except for motions to enlarge time, five
copies shall be filed with the original m the Supreme Court, and four copies shall be filed with
the original in the Court of Appeals, but the
court may require that additional copies be furnished Only the original of a motion to enlarge
time shall be filed
(2) Motions and other papers shall be typewritten on opaque, unglazed paper 8' 2 b\ 11
inches in size The text shall be in type not
smaller than ten characters per inch Lines of
text shall be double spaced and shall be upon one
side of the paper only Consecutive sheets shall
be attached at the upper left margin
(3) A motion or other paper shall contain a
caption setting forth the name of the court, the
title of the case, the docket number, and a brief
descriptive title indicating the purpose of the paper The attorney shall sign all papers filed with
the court with his or her individual name The
attorney shall give his or hei business address,
telephone number, and Utah State Bar number
m the upper left hand corner of the first page of
every paper filed with the court except briefs A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign any paper filed with the court and state the
party's address and telephone number
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in
the order indicated
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the
caption of the case on appeal contains the names
of all such parties The list should be set out on a
separate page which appears immediately inside
the cover
(2) A table of contents, with page references
(3) A table of authonties with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules,
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statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the bnef where they are
cited
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction
of the appellate court
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of appellate review for
each issue with supporting authority for each issue
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim
with the appropriate citation If the pertinent
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone
will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall
be set forth as provided in paragraph (0 of this
rule
(7) A statement of the case The statement
6hall first indicate briefly the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in
the court below A statement of the facts relevant
to the issues presented for review shall follow
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to
the record (see paragraph (e))
(8) Summary of arguments The summary of
arguments suitably paragraphed shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged
(9) An argument The argument shall contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee
shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of
this rule, except that a statement of the issues or of .
the case need not be made unless the appellee is dis- *
satisfied with the statement of the appellant
(c* Reply brief. The appellant may file a bnef in
reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee
has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues
presented by the cross-appeal Reply briefs shall be
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the
opposing brief No further briefs may be filed except
with leave of the appellate court
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will
be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep .
to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee" It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of
parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee,"
"the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc
(e) References in briefs to the record. Refer*
ences shall be made to the pages of the original record
as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of the
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of
the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g) References to
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers If reference is
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in con- m
troversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the
transcript at which the evidence was identified, of
fered, and received or rejected
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules,
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(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision,
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or order per
taming to the issues on appeal and any jur> ID
structions or other part of the record of central
importance to the determination of the appeal
shall be reproduced in the bnef or in an adden
dum to the brief
(2) If determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations
etc , or relevant parts thereof to the extent not
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6> of this rule
they shall be reproduced in the brief or m an
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to
the court in pamphlet form
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the
court, pnncipal bnefs shall not exceed 50 pages and
reply bnefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of cita
tions and any addendum containing statutes rules
regulations, or portions of the record as required b\
paragraph (f) of this rule
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a
cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of
appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes
of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise
agree or the court otherwise orders The brief of the
appellee shall contain the issues and arguments in
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to
the bnef of the appellant
d) Briefs in cases involving multiple appe)
lants or appellees. In cases involving more than one
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join
in a single brief, and am appellant or appellee ma\
adopt b> reference any part of the brief of another
Parties ma> similarly join in reply briefs
0) Citation of supplemental authorities When
pertinent and significant authorities come to the at
tention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision a
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate
court, by letter setting forth the citations An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court An onginal letter and seven copies shall be
filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a refer
ence either to the page of the bnef or to a point ar
gued orally to which the citations pertain but the
letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations Any response shall be
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarl)
limited

(k) Requirements and sanctions All bnefs un
der this rule must be concise, presented with accu
racy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant immatenal or
scandalous matters Briefs which are not in compli
ance may be disregarded or stncken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court ma\ assess attor
ney fees against the offending lawyer
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of
heavy cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27
Rule 25. Bnef of an amicus curiae or guardian
ad litem.
A bnef of an amicus cunae or of a guardian ad
litem representing a minor who is not a party to the
appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on
motion or at the request of the court A motion for
leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
runae or the suardian ad litem is desirable Except

